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This paper seeks to determine whether or not the divesture of Nigeria’s state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) is ethical. Towards this end, 
it employs an analytic methodology to undertake a conceptual examination of the divesture of 
Nigeria’s SOEs by the FGN. The paper’s findings are: 
(1) A large proportion of the Nigerian citizenry is opposed to its government’s privatization 
policy. 
(2) A conducive socio-economic environment for privatization is lacking in Nigeria. 
The paper concludes that although privatization in general may be a “good” policy, it is 
ethically wrong for the FGN to privatize some (and perhaps most) of its SOEs, given the 
absence of a conducive socio-economic milieu. 
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Privatization is a fundamental demand and policy implication of neoliberalism. It has been a 
subject of intense global debate in recent years. It encompasses both a wide range of ideas 
and policies, and diverse options for involvement of private capital and management in the 
running, control and operations of public or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The policy 
gained currency in politics and international economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
largely due to the rise of conservative governments in the United Kingdom, the United States 
and France, among others. Thus privatization emerged as a reaction against the growth of 
government in the West (Starr 1989, 15). 
Privatization can be defined as a “shifting into nongovernmental hands some or all roles in 
producing a good or service that was publicly produced or might be publicly produced” 
(Bendick 1989, 98) or as “any shift of activities or functions from the state to the private 
sector” (Starr 1989, 21). Privatization in this sense is the process by which control and 
ownership of an enterprise, business or agency is transferred from the public sector 
(government) to the private sector. In this paper I reflect on privatization in Nigeria in 
general, and on the ethical1dimension of the divesture of the country’s SOEs by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN) in particular. My aim is to make the case that although 
privatization in general may be a “good” or viable economic policy, it is immoral for the 
FGN to privatize some (and perhaps most) of its SOEs given Nigeria’s socio-economic 
milieu. 
I begin by examining some issues that arise from the idea of privatization. Next, I present a 
brief background to public enterprises in Nigeria. I then examine the privatization exercise in 
Nigeria, as well as some opposition to it. I go on to make a case as to why I consider 
unethical the transfer by the FGN of some of Nigeria’s SOEs to the private sector. 
2. Privatization, Economic Efficiency, and Economic Growth 
Discussions on privatization mostly bring up two closely related issues. The first concerns the 
relationship between privatization and economic efficiency. On this issue, the fundamental 
question is whether the private sector can more efficiently deliver goods or services than the 
                                                
1	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  shall	  use	  the	  term	  ethics	  interchangeably	  with	  morality.	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public sector. This issue arises primarily because the private sector is conceived around a 
system of benefits of rights and rewards, and unlike the public sector it places greater 
importance on profit maximization. The second issue concerns the increase in the level of 
economic growth vis-à-vis the private and public sectors. That is, is the rise in the rate of 
economic growth a function of the growth in the private sector or the public sector? 
On both of these issues the jury is still out. One who takes the view that the public sector 
facilitates economic growth — in much the same way as the private sector — or that the 
public sector is no less or more efficient in the delivery of goods and services than the private 
sector may not conceive privatization as a solution to the ailing aspects of the economy (say, 
in the production of public goods).  Of course one who holds this view may opt for a robust 
private and public mixed economy, especially if that person shares the view that both the 
private and public sectors do contribute to the “welfare mix” - goods and services produced 
by public agencies or funded by tax revenue. 2  
Nevertheless, underneath this debate of private and public mix is one fundamental question: 
is privatization a “good” or viable economic policy? Let us say that privatization is a viable 
policy if it is the case that (a) the rate of economic growth rises as the private sector grows 
and (b) the private sector generates a larger welfare total and welfare mix from available 
resources than the public sector. My take here is that even if a strong case can be made for 
privatization, namely, that it is a viable policy, that would not in and of itself legitimize 
privatization of public enterprises across the board. In particular, it would not make it morally 
right for a country to privatize some (or perhaps most) of its SOEs. 
On the issue of the status of privatization as a policy three positions are easily discernible. 
The first takes the view that privatization is a viable policy, the second takes the opposite 
view, that is, that privatization is not a viable policy, and the third is more or less “agnostic”, 
that is, it takes the view that privatization is neither viable nor unviable (Nwoye 1997).  Let 
us call those who defend the first view proponents of privatization and those who defend the 
second critics of privatization. I will not concern myself with the third view in this paper. I 
now want to talk briefly about the other views. 
                                                
2	   See	   Rose	   (1989:	   73-­‐95)	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   how	   both	   the	   private	   and	   public	   sectors	   contribute	   to	   the	  
production	  of	  the	  welfare	  mix.	  
The Ethics of Government Privatisation in Nigeria 91 
	  
	  
Proponents of privatization claim that it is an instrument of efficient resource allocation and 
management. Privatization, they claim, would reduce poverty by improving the economic 
indices of a country. In general, they argue that over time privatization will lead to less 
corruption and red tape, and strengthen the role of the private sector in the economy, thus 
guaranteeing employment, improved quality of life, and lead to higher capacity utilization 
(e.g. lower prices, make more choices available, and ensure faster delivery of goods and 
services). Those who defend privatization may point to a survey by Shirley and Walsh (2000) 
that indicates that overall privately-owned firms are more efficient than SOEs.3 
In contrast, critics of privatization generally advance the following claims in support of the 
position that privatization is not a viable policy. The first of the claims is that privatization 
would lead to a negative effect on the distribution of wealth. Simply put, privatization would 
exacerbate social and economic inequalities. Another claim is that the policy would cause a 
reduction both in income levels and access to basic social goods and services. A third claim is 
that privatization would lead to an increase in prices in goods and services. Finally, there is 
the claim that as a policy, privatization would contribute to loss of employment. In addition 
to these claims, which we shall call “endogenous claims,” there are some critics who offer 
what we shall call “exogenous claims” as to why privatization should be rejected as an 
economic reform policy. The first of these arguments is that privatization is a neocolonialist 
policy meant to exploit developing countries. Another is the claim that privatization is a 
neoliberal view of development imposed by large corporations or multinationals, foreign 
capitalist’s countries and agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB). I will say a little bit more about these claims later in this paper. 
                                                
3 The survey covers 52 major studies spanning the period from 1971 to 2000 and different 
market structures ranging from statutory monopoly to competitive firms. The conclusion that 
they reached is that the ambiguity about the relationship between ownership and performance 
is more theoretical than empirical. The result of their survey shows the following: of the 52 
studies, 32 confirm the superiority of private and privatized corporations over those that are 
publicly owned; 15 are ambiguous or find no significant relationship between ownership and 
performance; 5 show that SOEs perform better than private firms.  
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Henceforth, I will use the term “global economic empire” (GEE) to refer collectively to the 
multinationals, the big capitalist’s countries, IMF, and the WB. 
Paul Starr has pointed out that the “normative theories justifying privatization as a direction 
for public policy draw their inspiration from several different visions of a good society,” 
foremost of which is “the vision grounded in laissez-faire individualism and free-market 
economics that promises greater efficiency, a smaller government, and more individual 
choice if only we expand the domain of property rights and market forces” (Starr 1989, 26). 
Adeyemo (2008, 404) refers to the laissez-faire individualistic view as one of the most 
important of the four distinctive schools of thought on privatization, “which favors the 
unleashing of the competitive profit motive by emancipating free-market pricing from the 
interfering hands of state regulation”. That is, on the view of the laissez-faire individualistic 
economic theory, privatization allows individuals to reap the advantages of the market system 
and competition through efficient service delivery (Ugorji 1995, 537-560). The core idea 
embedded in the laissez-faire and purely individualistic model is simple, and it is this: 
property is better tended when it is privately owned. That is to say, the more rights or 
ownership an individual has over a particular property and the more he or she stands to gain 
or loss from tending to that property, the better it will be tended; and conversely, the less 
right he or she has over a particular property, the less motivated that individual will be to care 
for it. This is an instance of what Garrett Hardin (2003, 364-372) calls “the tragedy of the 
commons”. This is to say that when people behave out of rational self-interest or do what is 
best for themselves, they tend to abuse and destroy the commons, which ultimately makes 
everyone worse-off.  Stated differently, common property will always be destroyed because 
the gain that individuals make overexploiting it will outweigh the loss they suffer as a result 
of its overexploitation. 
The argument that public sector ownership is an instance of ‘the tragedy of the commons’, 
and that when people individually own property they tend to care for it better, goes as 
follows: when an enterprise is privately operated and owned, market forces provide the gauge 
for its efficiency and the needed drive for performance of the managers. If profits from an 
enterprise are relatively low or if it is running at a loss, shareholders will sell their stock. If 
they sell, the price of stock will be depressed and the value of the enterprise will decrease. If 
the price of stock and the value of the enterprise go down, potential shareholders and 
outsiders may either stay away from investing in it or, in an extreme case, acquire it at an 
incredibly low value. If it is acquired by outsiders, the managers may lose their jobs. Given 
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that the managers would not want to lose their jobs (since they are operating from the motive 
of rational self-interest), they will perform as best as they can to ensure that the enterprise is 
viable and maximizes profits. 
However, these crucial deterrents and disincentives to inefficient management and 
performance seem to be missing from the public sector. Governments have few incentives, or 
do not have the same amount of motivation, to ensure that SOEs are efficiently run, partly 
because the check on inefficient management and performance is minimal, if not absent. For 
one, it is hard to know if an enterprise is efficient or not without competitors to compare it to. 
As well, it is difficult for the government and citizens to evaluate the efficiency of numerous 
and very different enterprises. Moreover, citizens (“shareholders”) have no transferable 
property rights in SOEs, i.e. they cannot sell stock as a signal of dissatisfaction with 
inefficiency, since there is no “market for corporate control”. This is to say that even if public 
enterprises are performing poorly, they cannot be taken over by bidders who believe that they 
can make more efficient use of the assets (Starr 1989, 28). In simple terms, citizens sink or 
swim with public enterprises. 
The claim that the private sector can more efficiently deliver many goods or services than the 
public sector, and that as the public sector grows rates of economic growth tend to fall is not 
without debate. This is more so when we consider the fact that the private sector does not 
always guarantee economic efficiency and growth. The collapse of the economy of Argentina 
following the massive and aggressive privatization programme of the then president Carlos 
Menem (July 1989-December 1999) and the subsequent success stories of workers-take-and-
run factories illustrate this.4 Also, the performance of some SOEs (e.g. in Malaysia and 
France) has been excellent (Saunders 1985, 1-21; Kuttner 1984).5 Besides, while it may be 
true, as Starr (1989, 40) notes, that ‘the record of central government planning is dismal, it 
does not follow that this experience can simply be extrapolated to all publicly owned 
                                                
4	  See	  the	  documentary,	  The	  take	  and	  the	  novel	  The	  silent	  change	  by	  Esteban	  Magnani	  for	  a	  chronicling	  of	  the	  
workers	  recovered	  factories	  in	  Argentina.	  See	  also	  http://www.thetake.org/	  ,	  (Accessed	  28	  November	  2010).	  
5	  In	  The	  economic	  illusion:	  false	  choices	  between	  prosperity	  and	  social	  justice,	  Kuttner	  argues	  that	  the	  view	  that	  
social	  justice	  is	  bad	  for	  economic	  growth	  is	  an	  illusion	  and	  that	  prosperity	  and	  social	  justice	  can	  be	  reconciled,	  
and	  can	  be	  mutually	  reinforcing.	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organizations, particularly in states with more autonomous forms of public sector 
management’.6  
3. A Brief Background to Public Enterprises in Nigeria 
Even though the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) was a major player in the country’s 
economy in the 1960s when it established statutory corporations and invested significantly in 
other private companies, it was not until 1972 when the Indigenization Decree was 
introduced that its presence and control of the economy became increasingly dominant 
(Adeyemo 2008, 403). The decree effectively transferred privately controlled international 
corporations in Nigeria into SOEs, which were funded by the country’s new found oil wealth. 
At the end of the nationalization exercise there were over 1000 SOEs in virtually all sectors 
of the economy, covering oil and gas, education, steel plants, defense, manufacturing, mass 
transit, housing, banks, power, security, agriculture, housing and Medicare. By 1986, the 
estimated number of SOEs in Nigeria was 1,500, out of which 600 were under the FGN and 
the rest under States and Local Governments. The estimated 1,500 enterprises accounted for 
about 66% of formal sector employment, for over 50% of the gross domestic product, and for 
about 57% of aggregate fixed capital investment by 1997 (Jerome 2008 4). 
It is estimated that successive Nigerian governments invested about 800 billion naira 
(approximately US$100 billion) in the public enterprise sector over two decades (1975-1995). 
This investment is one of the largest by an African government (Obasanjo 20097). As at the 
end of 2000, only 160 of these enterprises were engaged in economic activities. It is 
estimated that about 5,500 board appointments exist in the non-performing enterprises, and 
that over 50 percent of all non-performing public sector debts in Nigeria were generated by 
these enterprises. For example, NICON Hilton and Sheraton Hotels are said to have 
respectively generated US$300 million and US$250 million worth of debt. 
4. The Privatization Exercise in Nigeria: Problems and Opposition 
There are two chapters in Nigeria’s privatization programme. Even though the chapters 
happened under different administrations, they had similar core objectives. The chief aims in 
both chapters include opening up the country’s economy to global market forces; attracting 
                                                
6	  In	  “Public	  expenditure	  and	  economic	  performance	  in	  OECD	  Countries”,	  Peter	  Saunders	  has	  argued	  forcefully	  
that	  it	  is	  necessarily	  not	  true	  that	  as	  public	  sectors	  grow	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  fall.	  
7	  See	  also	  Nwoye,	  “Privatization	  of	  public	  enterprises	  in	  Nigeria”	  and	  Jerome	  (2008:	  4).	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more investment, foreign and local; fostering economic growth; attaining macroeconomic 
stability; building a broader tax base system; delimiting the role of government in the 
economy; reducing the country’s fiscal deficits, public sector borrowing, subsidies and 
subventions to unprofitable public enterprises (Adeyemo 2005, 226-228; Etieyibo 2011, 38-
39). 
Like many other developing countries, following various recommendations by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in the early 1980s, Nigeria 
embarked on the privatization of some of its SOEs in the late 1980s. There were 
unprecedented economic problems in Nigeria in the early 1980s, leading to the accumulation 
of debt. The need to address this meant that Nigeria had to consider borrowing from the WB 
and IMF. Anyanwu observes: 
By 1983, Nigeria’s short term trade arrears, amounting to over N4billion, had 
accumulated while unemployment was aggravated and serious balance of 
payments deficits incurred. Nigeria, under the Shagari regime, had to apply to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a three year extended facility loan 
of US$2.3billion (Anyanwu 1992, 5, 6). 
Of course, seventeen conditions were attached as part of the financial assistance from the WB 
and IMF. Negotiations dragged on through the Buhari regime to the Babangida regime until 
1985. Although the loan was eventually rejected by Nigeria (after some public debate), an 
agreement on the conditions had already been reached. This agreement included 
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was aimed at 
restructuring the economy and making it more competitive and efficient (Adeyemo 2008, 
410). SAP exacerbated the economic crisis in Nigeria, including triggering chronic inflation, 
worsening of the inequalities in income and real wealth,  a dampening effect on savings  etc. - 
a crisis that eventually led in 1988 to the first phase of the privatization exercise (Anyanwu 
1992, 8-16). 
Chapter I of the privatization programme started in 1988, when Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida 
(1985-1993) issued the Privatization and Commercialization Decree No. 25 of 1988 as part of 
SAP. The decree which established the Technical Committee on Privatization of Public 
Companies (TCPC) defines privatization as “the relinquishment of part or all of the equity 
and other interests held by the Federal Government or its agency in enterprises, whether 
wholly or partly owned by the Federal Government.” The 11-member committee, which had 
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as its first chairman Hamzad Zayyad was inaugurated on 27th August 1988, with a broad 
mandate to coordinate the rehabilitation of SOEs and the disposal of Government equities in 
the Nigerian capital market, and to oversee the entire privatization and commercialization 
programme. The committee, which was mandated to privatize 111 public enterprises and to 
commercialize 34 others, commenced actual divestiture in the early months of 1989 with the 
shares of Flour Mills of Nigeria, African Petroleum, National Oil and Chemical Company, 
and United Nigeria Insurance Company being issued in the market. From 1988 to 1993 when 
the privatization process was suspended, the committee, through mostly public floatation, 
succeeded in privatizing about 88 out of the 111 enterprises listed in the decree. 
Chapter II of the privatization programme began on 20th July 1998, when, by the Public 
Enterprises Privatization and Commercialization Act of 1999, the National Council on 
Privatization (NCP) was established with the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) as its 
secretariat. The statutory and policy mandate of the NCP  and BPE includes (a) the 
formulation of policies on privatization and commercialization; (b) the approval of guidelines 
and criteria for valuation of public enterprises slated for privatization; and (c) the choice of 
strategic investors, share prices and assets of SOEs, privatization advisers and consultants, 
and enterprises for commercialization. Under the three-phase privatization programme 
announced by President Olusegun Obasanjo shortly after his election in 1999, the goal of the 
FGN is to divest through privatization or commercialization about 100 SOEs in the following 
order: 
First Phase: complete divestment of shares in oil marketing companies, banks and cement 
plants that are already quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
Second Phase: complete divesture of shares in hotels, vehicle assembly plants and other 
enterprises operating in competitive markets where no regulation of price or market behavior 
is of primary concern to government. 
Third Phase: Partial divestment of shares in major public enterprises currently operating in 
non-competitive sectors. This includes the utility companies — power and 
telecommunications, the fertilizer plants, the airways and the Petroleum refineries — 
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enterprises operating in monopoly or near-monopoly markets where public interest regulation 
is necessary.8 
So far the BPE has made considerable progress in the implementation of the privatization 
programme. As of last count, it has privatized about 400 SOEs. Given the core objectives of 
                                                
8 Some of the cardinal public enterprises earmarked for privatization include: the information 
group which has the Daily Times of Nigeria, Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, New 
Nigerian Newspapers, News Agency of Nigeria and Nigeria Television Authority; the 
petroleum sector comprising of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Eleme 
Petrochemicals, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Warri refineries, Nigerian Gas Company, Petroleum 
and Pipelines Marketing Company, African Petroleum, UniPetrol, National Oil, Dresser 
Nigeria Limited, Baker Nigeria Limited; the financial enterprises made up of NICON 
Insurance, Nigerian Reinsurance, Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, Assurance 
Bank, FSB Bank, Afribank BIAO shares; airlines and airports sector consisting of Nigeria 
Airways, FAAN, NEMA; the natural resources sector made up of all 12 Water River Basin 
Development Authorities; the agriculture sector which has the National Park Board, Ore Oil 
Palm, and Ihechiowa Oil Palm; the solid minerals sector comprising of the Nigerian Mining 
Corporation, Nigerian Coal Corporation, Nigeria Uranium Company Limited; the transport 
sector consisting of the Nigeria Ports Authority, Nigeria Railways, Nigerdock, NAHCO; 
state-owned Industries which are made up of NAFCON, Federal Super Phosphate Fertilizer 
Company, Nigerian Machine Tools, Nigerian Paper Manufacturing Company Limited, 
Nigerian Sugar Company, Bachita, Ashaka Cement, Sunti Sugar Company, Benue Cement 
Company, Calaber Cement, Leyland, Peugeot Automobile Nigeria Limited, Volkswagen 
Nigeria Limited; the housing sector made up of Federal Mortgage Bank, Federal Mortgage 
Finance Limited, Federal Housing Authority; telecoms and postal services sector which has 
NITEL, MTEL and NIPOST; power sector comprising of NEPA and its subsidiaries; the 
power and steel group which consist of Oshogbo Steel Rolling Mills, Jos Steel Rolling Mill, 
Delta Steel Rolling Mill, Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Mill, Aluminum Smelter Company Limited, 
National Iron Ire Mining Company Limited; the hotel and recreation sector which has the 
Nigeria Hotels Limited and Festac 77 Hotels. 
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Nigeria’s privatization policy and the progress that the bureau has made in its 
implementation, one may claim that the exercise has been an “enormous success”. But not so 
quick, for although on the face of it significant progress has been made, there have been 
numerous problems with the exercise. Indeed, it would be an understatement to say that the 
discontentment with the privatization programme among Nigerians has reached fever pitch. 
The programme has been dogged by one controversy after another, most of which have 
fuelled the negative public perception about the programme. Consider just a few examples: 
The  sale of NITEL, Pentascope, NEPA or Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) has 
been entangled in a panoply of controversies. 
The inability of  the 18 successor companies to PHCN to properly function due to lack of 
transparency in the entire process. 
The recent termination of the sale of NITEL to Omen International Consortium for its 
inability to revalidate its bid bond of $105 million at the deadline of June 10, 2011. 
The muddled ports, power and oil sectors reforms, particularly NNPC and LNG. 
The sale of the Daily Times of Nigeria to Folio Communications, an Indian company for $30 
Million, and the January 2010 ruling by the Federal High Court in Nigeria voiding the sale of 
140 million shares of DTN to Folio Communications. 
The controversial privatization of national steel companies (Ajaokuta and Delta Steel Plants) 
to Global Infrastructure. 
The revocation of 18 private refineries licenses immediately after they were granted. 
The confusion that trailed the sale of the national refineries, African Petroleum, Stallion 
House, the properties of the FGN in Lagos and Abuja, Unity Schools, and Trade Fair 
Complex. 
Apart from the general public discontent with the implementation of the privatization 
programme, there is also the poor performance of the privatized enterprises.9 Adoga (2008, 
                                                
9 On the issue of post-privatization performance of some privatized public enterprises in 
Nigeria some studies show mixed and average performance. While they were increases in 
some of the performance indicators (e.g. profitability, productive and technical efficiency, 
employment, capital investment, output, prices, leverage, employment, dividend payout, etc) 
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5) has identified some of the reasons for the discontent  and the causes of the poor 
performance of the privatized enterprises as: (1) the inchoate or lopsided asset acquisition and 
share purchase agreements; (2) the non enforceable clauses and breach of share purchase 
agreements; (3) the carrying out of due diligence exercise of large corporations at the data 
room of the BPE instead of a full financial and physical audit; (4) the under valuation of 
assets of state-owned enterprises; (5) the practice of aggressive asset stripping by private 
sector firms acquiring SOEs. 
Strikingly, in a recent interview, the former Director-General of the BPE, Chris Anyanwu 
(2009) admitted that only 10% of the 400 privatized public enterprises in Nigeria are properly 
functioning. He blamed the failure of most of the privatized enterprises on the absence of 
effective regulation and on the hurried manner they were sold, particularly without due 
diligence carried out to ascertain the financial and technical competence of investors. The 
bureau, he says, has been given a presidential mandate to revoke over 350 of the privatized 
enterprises which have failed to perform to expectation since 1999. 
Indeed, the privatization policy has been unpopular among Nigerians. It has received 
substantial criticism from labour unions, academia, civil servants, lawmakers and individual 
citizens. The World Bank said the following about opposition to the privatization exercise: 
While the Obasanjo administration is strongly committed to an accelerated 
privatization programme, significant stakeholder groups are resisting the 
reforms. These include [public enterprise] managers and employees, senior 
government officials and civil servants, notably in sectoral ministries, who 
perceive that their current power and perquisites will be reduced as the 
privatization programme is implemented. In the National Assembly, a range of 
politicians view privatization as a threat to national sovereignty, and an 
unwarranted reduction in the role of the state (World Bank 2001, 22). 
The WB was right about one thing. At the start of the exercise (and continuing) there was 
vigor resistance to the policy implementation in Nigeria. There were numerous strikes against 
                                                                                                                                                  
for some privatized enterprises they were no increase and sometimes decrease in other 
indicators for some other enterprises. See Jerome (2008) and Uzochukwu (2003), 
‘Productivity and efficiency of some privatized public enterprises in Nigeria’. Whereas the 
study by Jerome examined UBA, Unipetrol, and Ashaka Cement, Uzochukwu’s study 
examined Aba Textile Mills, FSB International Bank PLC, and Ashaka Cement. 
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proposed sale of SOEs by labor unions fearing among other things loss of jobs and the 
exacerbation of economic inequalities and poverty. There were other factors that affected the 
implementation of the policy. These included deep-seated ethnic and regional differences in 
the Nigerian society, the lack of transparency in the privatization process, absence of a 
popularly acceptable regulatory framework, and neglect of issues relating to social and public 
interest. 
We can divide critics of the privatization programme in Nigeria into two groups. On the one 
hand, we have critics who offer exogenous claims, that is, those who contend that 
privatization is a threat to national sovereignty. On the other hand, we have critics that 
provide endogenous claims, that is, those who assert that privatization is inimical to 
economic growth. Both critics, we might say, take their claims as justifying the view that 
privatization is not a viable policy, at least within the context of the Nigerian society. 
Exogenous critics claim on the one hand, that privatization is an imposition by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, and on the other hand, that it is a neo-liberal approach to development. 
These assertions are not groundless, considering the normative foundations of privatization 
and the fact that it emerged as a reaction against the growth of government in the West. 
Exogenous critics are concerned primarily with preserving government autonomy, power and 
interests. To this extent, they are quick to blame Western countries, the IMF and the WB for 
coercing African countries, whether overtly or covertly,  to privatize their public services - an 
exercise that they claim can only favour corporations, affluent countries and individuals 
(Brooke 1987; Killen 1987; Washington Financial Report 1986). According to this group of 
critics, Western countries and agencies bully African states to privatize their natural resources 
both as part of globalization and as a condition for development assistance (Nwoye 1997). 
They contend that these countries and agencies tell impoverished and developing countries 
‘to turn their public services over to private owners and to sell off their oil, gas, mining, 
electric, telecommunication, transport and water companies as conditions for debt relief’ and 
in the negotiations for loans (Nwoye 1997; Starr 1989, 39). 
Endogenous critics claim that there is no clear evidence to support the view that privatization 
leads to efficient delivery of goods and services, and that in fact it may not lead to economic 
growth. A 1997 study by Nwoye which compared the effectiveness of public and private 
service delivery in Nigeria provides some support for those who defend this view. According 
to the study (Nwoye 1997), there is “no clear evidence that private service delivery is 
inherently more effective or less effective than public service delivery, but rather that each 
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sector has its own strengths and weaknesses.” Furthermore, Sam Aluko10 has argued that 
much of private sector profits in Nigeria are not the result of efficient operation and increased 
productivity, but rather often represent money that private contractors make through corrupt 
or illegal political rents, namely, public sector connections and influence, inflated contracts 
and patronage. The point that these commentators are making is a subtle one, namely, that it 
is not clear if privatization does actually lead to efficient delivery of goods and services in 
Nigeria, even if we think that in general it has the potential to do so. 
The World Bank claimed that much of the opposition to privatization at the start of its 
implementation were due to narrow interests. According to the agency, those most opposed to 
the exercise were individuals who “perceive that their current power and perquisites will be 
reduced as the privatization programme is implemented” (World Bank 2001, 22). The WB 
may be right about this, but this does not explain the motivation behind other objections to 
privatization in Nigeria. In particular, it does not explain the motivation behind endogenous 
critics and those that may be opposed to privatization on moral grounds. 
Exogenous critics claim that privatization is a threat to national sovereignty, and an 
imposition by the Global Economic Empire (GEE). However, the fact that something is 
imposed on a party by an external source, or that some forms of economic assistance are 
made dependent on a party’s compliance with a particular policy, does not mean that such a 
policy is in and of itself not viable. For instance, in order to qualify for scarce medical 
resources and services a patient may be required to follow a particular health regime, or to 
make certain health choices. Another helpful example is the common practice adopted by 
some parents to motivate their children to behave “responsibly”. They may deny their 
children access to family resources, or promise to pay their college tuition as a way of 
encouraging them to quit certain behavior, like smoking, gambling, and excessive drinking. 
One may frown at these policies, label them “arm-twisting” and paternalistic, and flatly reject 
them. Yet one may be inclined to say that it is the unhealthy choices such as smoking and 
excessive drinking — that are bad, and that they are bad independent of the tactics that are 
adopted to put them in check. 
                                                
10 Cited in Adeyemo (2005, 225). 
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It is also important to point out that there is something to be said about the motivation 
underlying the imposition of privatization on developing countries by the GEE. The 
arguments and firsthand accounts provided by a number of scholars suggest that the push for 
privatization by the WB and IMF may be driven by interests other than those of developing 
countries; that is, they are more often motivated by the need to advance the interests of a few 
elite and corporate hegemony rather than by the interests of developing countries. Steve 
Berkman, a former employee of the WB, claims that the development strategies pushed by 
the institution onto developing countries for decades have generally diverted development 
money into the pockets of corrupt elites and their partners in industrialized countries, not to 
mention that these hundreds of billions of dollars schemes have not been successful and have 
left the poor to shoulder the burden of paying off the debts (Berkman 2007, 157-174). 
Berkman’s account is substantiated by that of John Perkins in Confessions of an economic hit 
man. In this book, Perkins (2004) claims that he was an “economic hit man” for 10 years, 
helping U.S. intelligence agencies and multinationals to coax foreign governments to enter 
into all sorts of economic agreements and transactions, and into accepting billions of dollars 
of loans from the WB and other financial institutions to build infrastructure that they could 
not afford.11 
David Korten provides some of the arguments underlying the accounts of Berkman and 
Perkins. He notes that the allegiance of the world’s large corporations is “purely to further 
their own bottom lines” rather than “national or local interests” (Korten 2001, 127). Like the 
imperial European powers that colonized territories in other continents partly in search of 
bigger markets and outlets to harvest resources, multinationals seek such outlets through the 
creation of a globalized economy. Such outlets get significantly widened when countries sign 
free trade agreements and adopt economic reform policies like SAP, liberalization and 
privatization, which are generally pushed by the WB and IMF. Because these policies 
collectively render national economic borders increasingly irrelevant, large corporations are 
easily able to further their interests. Two problems emerge from this. Firstly, the convergence 
of ideological, political and technological forces propelling a process of economic 
globalization is shifting power away from governments that are responsible for the public 
                                                
11	   Perkins’	   book,	   Confessions	   of	   an	   Economic	   Hit	   Man	   implicates	   the	   highest	   echelons	   of	   government	   and	  
corporations,	   including	   the	   IMF,	  World	  Trade	  Organizations,	  World	  Bank,	   “G8”	   countries	   in	   various	   levels	  of	  
corruption	  in	  developing	  countries	  including	  money	  	  laundering,	  tax	  evasion,	  and	  environmental	  disasters	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good toward a handful of corporations and financial institutions that have aggregated global 
economic and political power, and who are “driven by a single imperative, the quest for 
short-term financial gain” (Korten 2001, 22). This creates a situation where governments are 
unable to respond adequately to public frustration with regard to the crisis in their various 
local economies. The GEE often lay the problem at the doorstep of governance, of 
government bureaucracies, and of inefficient SOEs. But Korten claims this is mistaken. The 
problem, he argues, stems primarily from the pressure that governments face from the 
world’s largest corporations (and if we might say the GEE) in general, and the seemingly 
powerlessness of governments to deal with elites, and with multinationals in particular. 
Secondly, because of the enormous political and economic power of multinationals, they 
have rendered many of the political roles of government obsolete. Due to the global levels of 
operations of large corporations, they are easily able to “routinely sidestep governmental 
restrictions based on old assumptions about national economies and foreign policy” (Korten 
2001, 129). A helpful example here is the case of the restrictions placed on Honda from 
importing Japanese cars into Taiwan, South Korea and Israel. Honda simply circumvented 
the restrictions by shipping Honda vehicles to these countries from its U.S. plant in Ohio. 
5. Ethics and Government Privatization in Nigeria 
Anyanwu’s unequivocal admission of the failure or non-performance of most of the 
privatized enterprises raises questions about the genuineness of the implementation of the 
privatization programme in Nigeria. In particular, it raises the specter of whether or not it is 
ethically right for the FGN to privatize some (and perhaps most) of Nigeria’s SOEs. Raising 
this issue brings us back to our earlier question concerning whether or not privatization is a 
viable policy or not. For the sake of this paper, I will assume that privatization is in general a 
viable policy. However, I shall argue that it is morally wrong for the FGN to privatize some 
of Nigeria’s public enterprises. 
Although ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are often used interchangeably, they are different. While 
ethics is the systematic and critical study of morality as a concept and a source of behavioral 
guidance, morality is a formal system of rules about how one ought to behave in society, that 
is, what is right or wrong. In applying ethics to morality, the objective is to see whether or not 
morality is rationally justified. Since my discussion focuses on the morality of privatization in 
Nigeria, it is first and foremost a normative rather than a metaethical account. While the latter 
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is concerned with the nature of moral language and judgment, the former is concerned with 
standards of evaluating right or wrong actions. 
I shall support my argument for the unethicalness with regards to the divesture of some of 
Nigeria’s SOEs by appealing to the view that privatization requires a particular socio-
economic milieu, and that this environment is absent in Nigeria. To better contextualize my 
argument, it is crucial to clear up two important points. First, how the argument plays out 
within the context of international and global trade relations, that is, in the light of 
“exogenous claims”; second, the sense of morality that I will be employing to develop my 
argument. Let me begin with the first. 
If the imposition of privatization primarily serves the interests of the GEE rather than those of 
developing countries, and if the governments of developing countries must necessarily cower 
before the GEE, then it would seem simplistic to either blame developing countries for 
divesting their SOEs or to construe the privatization exercise in Nigeria as unethical. There is 
some plausibility to this claim, but it is not entirely acceptable. This is because in many 
situations, the elite in the developing countries are often quite willing to go along with the 
GEE because of what they stand to gain by implementing these reform policies. In any case, 
even if we accept that the governments of developing countries are boxed into a corner to 
accept all sorts of developmental programmes that have little or no benefits to their countries, 
this would not exonerate them from moral opprobrium. From the fact that one commits a 
crime because one is forced to do so by external circumstances, it does not follow that one is 
not guilty of the crime. 
This takes me to the second point. In defending a particular ethical judgment, one may appeal 
to different principles or standards of morality that have been advanced by ethicists,.12 
However, I am not going to take this route. Rather I will defend my position of the 
unethicalness of the FGN with regards to its divesture of some of Nigeria’s SOEs by 
appealing to what I will call a shared “moral understanding or intuition”. I believe that this 
moral understanding is accepted in different forms by a number of major normative ethical 
                                                
12	  A	  look	  at	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  particularly	  in	  the	  West	  shows	  that	  a	  number	  of	  major	  normative	  ethical	  
theories	   subscribe	   to	   different	   ethical	   principles.	   There	   is	   virtue	   ethics	   which	   understands	   the	   goodness	   of	  
actions	   in	   term	  of	   virtues.	   There	   is	   also	  utilitarianism	  which	   takes	   the	  principle	  of	   utility	   as	   the	   standard	  by	  
which	  right	  actions	  are	  separated	  from	  wrong	  actions.	  And	  there	  is	  Kantianism	  which	  evaluates	  the	  rightness	  
and	  wrongness	  of	  actions	  by	  the	  categorical	  imperative.	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theories, and it is based on the concept of “paradoxical counterproductivity” - the view that a 
procedure that subverts the very purpose it is intended to serve is prima facie wrong.13 This 
view cements my argument, the nub of which is this: because of the absence of a particular 
socio-economic milieu in Nigeria, the privatization of some of its SOEs subverts the very 
purpose it is intended to achieve - economic efficiency and growth - and consequently is 
prima facie morally wrong. Thus it could be said that the evaluation of the privatization 
exercise in Nigeria with regard to its ethicalness or unethicalness differs markedly from the 
evaluation that is associated with the general conduct of individuals and institutions in 
society. 
6. Unethical Divesture of State Owned Enterprises by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria: The Argument 
The argument that it is ethically wrong for the FGN to transfer ownership and control of 
some of its SOEs to the private sector runs thus: Privatization has the potential to stimulate 
economic growth only in a particular socio-economic milieu. Such a milieu  is lacking in 
Nigeria, which is characterized by rampant bureaucratic corruption, widespread poverty, and 
a high rate of unemployment. Given this environment, it was morally wrong for the FGN to 
embark on privatization. 
To say that privatization in general is a viable policy is not the same as saying that it is 
intrinsically and unconditionally good. Something is intrinsically and unconditionally good 
when it is good in and of itself, that is good independent of either the outcomes that it 
produces or certain other circumstances. To say that privatization is not always good means 
among other things that certain conditions or factors determine its goodness; and to identify 
these conditions is to identify the sort of environment that has to be present if the policy is to 
be successfully implemented. In identifying these conditions one simply recognizes, on the 
one hand, the importance of divesture putting on a “social face” and, on the other, balancing 
the implementation of the policy with other existing national and local interests. This is 
particularly poignant given that it is generally agreed that there are enterprises that are better 
                                                
13 For a formulation and discussion of the “paradoxical counterproductivity” see Illich (1978: 
35, 117). 
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left to the public sector even if they could be more efficiently managed by the private sector. 
Examples include services of a sensitive nature such as national defense, and those that have 
public utility value such as education. A recent case that illustrates this general point is that of 
DP World, a state-owned maritime company in the United Arab Emirates. DP World bowed 
to pressure from the United States Congress to sell off its U.S. operations to an American 
owner following a furious controversy over port security (Weisman and Bradley 2006). 
In most countries, including those that aggressively implement privatization, education (up to 
a certain level) is made a matter of public concern and interest. Public schools are managed 
for the benefit of all citizens, particularly for those whose economic status disqualifies them 
for admission into private schools. Whereas private schools are run and maintained for profit, 
public schools are not. Private schools can reject applicants, but public schools are denied 
that option. Public schools are public, not only because they are state-owned and financed, 
but also because they are open to all children of eligible age in the area where they are 
located. Public utility and the importance of education are reasons for maintaining public 
schools, even when they are not making profits or not been ran very efficiently. The point is 
that other values and interests can sometimes override the goal of efficiency and profit 
motivation. Once we accept this proviso, we admit that it could be justifiable to leave some 
other enterprises in the public domain insofar as one is able to show that there are important 
values and interests (other than efficiency and profit-making) that need protecting. 
The view that privatization requires a particular socio-economic environment has been 
articulated in some form by the WB. Privatization, it says, is not “a blanket solution for the 
problems of poorly performing state-owned enterprises” (World Bank 2003). It adds: 
Most privatization success stories come from high income and middle-income 
countries. Privatization is easier to launch and more likely to produce positive 
results when the company operates in a competitive market and when the 
country has a market-friendly policy environment and a good capacity to 
regulate. The poorer the country, the longer the odds against privatization 
producing its anticipated benefits, and the more difficult the process of 
preparing the terrain for sale…. [Privatization] cannot in and of itself make up 
for a total lack of competition, for weak capital markets, or for the absence of 
an appropriate regulatory framework. But where the market is basically 
competitive, or when a modicum of regulatory capacity is present, private 
ownership yields substantial benefits.14 
                                                
14	  See	  also	  IMF	  Survey	  (1987).	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It is instructive that this is coming from the WB, the principal architect and advocate of 
privatization. From the above passage, we can say that some conditions must hold if any 
privatization programme is to be genuine and successful. In a way, to claim that a successful 
programme of privatization requires a particular socio-economic milieu, i.e. must meet 
certain conditions, is to claim that it is economically inexpedient, and, as I argue, morally 
wrong, for a country to divest its SOEs if these conditions are absent. That is to say these 
conditions stipulate when it is ethically permissible for a country to implement a privatization 
programme. If a country ignores this stipulation, it invariably subverts the very purpose that 
privatization is intended to achieve. 
Going by the quotation from the WB above, the first condition of a genuine privatization 
programme is that the country implementing it should be in either the high or middle income-
earning bracket. The second condition is that the market environment in the country should 
be a relatively competitive and stable one. The third is the presence of a market-friendly 
policy environment. Finally, there must be an appropriate regulatory framework for the 
economy. All four conditions and the fifth, which I discuss in a moment, require among other 
things the establishment of strong institutional frameworks both in the financial and legal 
sectors, and the need for transparent leadership in the privatization transactions.15 Any keen 
observer of the Nigerian socio-economic environment will know that these conditions are 
completely absent. 
The first condition ensures at least three things. First, that privatization does not concentrate 
wealth in a few hands, but rather that it is more generally spread out in the population. 
Second, that most of the investors are local rather than foreign. Third, that the circumstances 
of the poor are not exacerbated, and the divide between the poor and the rich is not widened 
(prices are generally expected to rise with privatization). 
                                                
15 On the issue of leadership and leadership crisis and failure in Nigeria see Achebe (1983), 
The trouble with Nigeria. In this book Achebe makes the case that the failure of leadership in 
Nigeria is primary responsible for others issues that Nigeria is/and has had to deal with and 
that if  the issue of leadership can be addressed Nigeria can resolve inherent problems like 
tribalism, indiscipline, social justice, corruption, and the cult of mediocrity. 
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In spite of its vast human and natural resources, Nigeria is a poor country, and the distribution 
of income is heavily skewed. Nigeria is among the bottom 20 countries in the world that has 
the widest gap between the rich and the poor, and has one of the highest Gini coefficient or 
index in the world. The Gini coefficient - named after the Italian statistician Corroda Gini 
(1884-1965) - measures the extent to which the distribution of income or wealth (or in some 
cases consumption expenditure) among individuals or households in a given economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.  A Gini coefficient of 0 represents absolute 
equality, while an index of 100 implies absolute inequality. Besides, the Human 
Development Index (HDI) ranking placed Nigeria 24th out of 84 countries in the low and 
medium human development category in 1987; 128th out of 160 countries in 1990; 148th out 
of 173 countries in 2000; 158th out of 182 countries in 2009; 142nd out of 169 countries in 
2010 (Oshewolo 2010, 264-265; CIA 2009; UNDP Human Development Reports). The HDI 
measures average achievements in basic dimensions of human development comprising 
statistics for life expectancy, education and gross domestic product collected at the national 
level. Furthermore, Nigeria has the third largest number of poor people after China and India. 
Statistics show that the incidence of poverty, i.e. the percentage of the population of those 
living in poverty (using the rate of US$1 per day) increased from 28.1% in 1980 to 46.3% in 
1985, and then to 65.6% in 1996. The incidence increased to 69.2% in 1997, and stood at 
64.4% and 83.9% (for US$1.25 and US$2 per day respectively) between the year 2000 and 
2007 (Oyelere 2010; Oshewolo 2010, 266-267; Omotola 2008, 496-517; CIA 2009; Oyelere 
2007). 
Both the second and third conditions are meant to prevent a privatization reform from 
perpetuating existing monopolies and concentrating them in private hands, and ensuring that 
prices of goods and services are determined by market forces, namely, the prices of basic 
goods and services are not so expensive that they are beyond the reach of the average citizen 
or the poor. The importance of these conditions to an economy cannot be overemphasized. 
This is because privatization does not necessarily lead to increased competition. Privatization 
is concerned with the divesture of government ownership of a public enterprise. Nevertheless, 
to divest in a market does not mean that the market is competitive, since the sale of SOEs 
could simply mean a transfer of public monopolies to private monopolies. To create a 
competitive environment, privatization must be accompanied or preceded by other forms of 
economic reforms such as deregulation and liberalization, both of which are aimed at opening 
up the market to competitive pressures. Given that it is entirely possible to privatize without 
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deregulating and liberalizing and to liberalize and deregulate without privatizing, we expect a 
comprehensive reform programme to target all three. 
The fourth condition is important because, among other things, it prevents privatized 
enterprises not only from gaming the system, but also guarantees that none of them is 
competitively disadvantaged and that they operate in an environment of fairness, and enjoy a 
level playing field. In short, a proper regulatory framework ensures that privatized enterprises 
are not locked in a Prisoner Dilemma scenario, in which although doing the “right” and 
‘lawful’ thing is the rational thing, they choose to do the “wrong” and “unlawful” thing, even 
though this has a suboptimal outcome. The point is that in the absence of a proper regulatory 
framework, some privatized enterprises will suffer a competitive disadvantage if they choose 
to do the “right” and “lawful” thing; and because they know that they will suffer a 
competitive disadvantage by doing the “right” and “lawful” thing, they will — like every 
other enterprise —choose to do the “wrong” and “unlawful” thing. 
We can add a fifth condition, namely, that for a successful privatization programme, there 
should be a minimally corrupt economic environment. Simply put, to ensure that government 
officials and their cronies do not employ privatization as a quick and efficient means of 
extracting corrupt or illegal political rents, the country’s corruption level must be relatively 
low. As indicated earlier, part of the reasons for the poor performance of many of the 
privatized enterprise is due to the lack of due diligence. I propose that this is due to 
widespread bureaucrat corruption in Nigeria.16 Elsewhere, I have argued for how 
privatization facilitates corruption by serving as an efficient way of extracting corrupt 
political rent;17 and as I earlier pointed out, there were widespread instances of corrupt 
practices with regards to the privatization exercise in Nigeria. 
To say that the level of corruption in Nigeria is significantly high is to state the obvious. For 
example, Transparency International’s corruption perception index covering the 1990s and 
mid 2000s consistently placed Nigeria among the 10 most corrupt countries in the world. Its 
                                                
16 The view that official corruption characterizes the Nigerian state is very well captured by 
Achebe as early as in the 1960s in his book, A Man of the People. 
17 Etieyibo (2011: 37-44). 
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2010 corruption perception index places Nigeria 134th out of 178 countries - certainly an 
improvement, partly due to the recent public fight against corruption. In a society such as 
Nigeria’s with considerable corruption, privatization serves as a tool to perpetuate graft, 
namely, to extract illegal political rents. By choosing to privatize its SOEs, the FGN ignored 
the lack of conditions necessary for an effective privatization. The two chapters of the 
country’s privatization programme (intentionally or unintentionally) improved the financial 
portfolio of an elite and augmented the hegemony of multinational corporations to the 
detriment of public interest. As such, the government acted unethically. 
7. Conclusion 
As an economic reform policy, privatization may lead to a smaller government and to greater 
wealth for some. In general it may be a viable policy, but it is not intrinsically and 
unconditionally good. The policy has created some concerns for Nigerians and political 
observers, and understandably so, partly because the conditions necessary for its 
implementation are egregiously lacking in the country. I have argued in this paper that (1) a 
genuine privatization programme must be preceded by the necessary socio-economic 
environment generally and (2) the FGN acted unethically by divesting from some of 
Nigeria’s SOEs. Even if we accept that there are things that are good about privatization or 
that it is in general a viable policy, the reality on the ground suggests that privatization in 
Nigeria was ill-advised. Given that the country’s economic environment lacks certain 
conditions requisite for successful privatization, it is not surprising that over 350 (out of the 
400) of the privatized SOEs have failed. 
This then raises the question as to why the IMF and WB prodded Nigeria to embrace 
privatization, especially given the WB’s acknowledgement that a successful privatization 
programme needs a particular socio-economic environment. Two reasons could be advanced 
for this. First, they do not adequately appreciate the dynamics of applying privatization in the 
developing economies of Africa, and particularly in Nigeria. Second, they are more interested 
in privatization for privatization sake, or in selling privatization as a reform policy given 
other pecuniary interests, namely, greasing the palms of multinationals and some 
industrialized countries. The point is that it seems that the IMF and WB will go to any length 
to advance other economic interests, not least theirs, and to promote their neoliberal policies. 
If I am right about this, then they have a case to answer for leading Nigeria down the path of 
privatization. On the other hand, the FGN has to take the responsibility for going down the 
road with the GEP. Insofar as it is not clear that it is unable to resist the move by the GEP, it 
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shares in the moral blame for divesting from many of Nigeria’s SOEs. In a nutshell, the 
government acted unethically. 
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